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Technological developments involving robotics and artificial intelligence devices are being
employed evermore in elderly care and the healthcare sector more generally, raising ethical
issues and practical questions warranting closer considerations of what wemean by “care”
and, subsequently, how to design such software coherently with the chosen definition.
This paper starts by critically examining the existing approaches to the ethical design of
care robots provided by Aimee van Wynsberghe, who relies on the work on the ethics of
care by Joan Tronto. In doing so, it suggests an alternative to their non-principled
approach, an alternative suited to tackling some of the issues raised by Tronto and
vanWynsberghe, while allowing for the inclusion of two orientative principles. Our proposal
centres on the principles of autonomy and vulnerability, whose joint adoption we deem
able to constitute an original revision of a bottom-up approach in care ethics. Conclusively,
the ethical framework introduced here integrates more traditional approaches in care
ethics in view of enhancing the debate regarding the ethical design of care robots under a
new lens.
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INTRODUCTION
Developments in robotics and automation technologies are rapidly changing many aspects of our
lives. The field of (health) care has been no exception, promising many boons while also bringing
about controversial ethical questions. This paper takes care robots for the elderly as an object of
analysis, evaluating the existing literature on their ethical and responsible design. In particular, we
aim to discuss the existent approach to the ethical design of care robots by Aimee van Wynsberghe
(2012); van Wynsberghe (2013a); van Wynsberghe (2016) that relies principally on the work on care
ethics by Joan Tronto while also exploring the viability of a care ethics approach that is
fundamentally non-principled, such as those expounded by Tronto (1993), Tronto (2010) in
view of possibly envisaging a conciliation between the two alternative proposals (§ 1).
Tronto argues that general principles are too broad to constitute a sufficiently stable justification
for actions consequent to care ethics. However, in recent years, the literature on care ethics has been
trying to identify principles that can have an informative and a justificatory role in making moral
decisions and carrying out moral actions in care practices (Collins, 2015) (§ 2). Though such an
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particularly relevant as a theoretical basis for care robot
programming, that is when the ultimate goal of philosophical
research is to program machines able to interact with human
beings in ways that are acceptable from a care ethics perspective.
To this end, this paper explores the possibility of integrating 1) a
care-ethical perspective based on the consideration of particular
care relationships, their contextual levels and the importance of
needs, emotions and sympathetic modes of deliberation with 2) a
principlist approach to care.
Such an approach asserts that orientative principles, rather
than constitutive ones, may have a justificatory role in grounding
proper forms of action and would constitute one to be included in
the category of the so-called “hybrid approaches” similar to the
one proposed by Van Rysewyk and Pontier (2015) but with
substantial differences that will be explored. According to a
Kantian approach, the proposed principles are argued to be
not mutually exclusive and contribute to identifying a more
comprehensive account of care ethics (§ 3).
In our view, this approach to care ethics can be operationalized
through an innovative account of two basic orientative principles
and their systemic interrelation: autonomy, on the one hand, and
the principle of vulnerability, on the other (§ 4). If successful, the
practical implications of this approach pave the way for a revision
of how care ethics is treated within the domain of engineering and
design and subsequently a reimagination of how to translate these
types of orientative principles into tangible design requirements.
And this las point is a fundamental point with regards to the
“design turn in applied ethics” (van den Hoven et al., 2017) given
that the traditional top-down and bottom-up approaches have
dominated the field of robotic design. Still, this paper does not
delve into this issue, but rather provides the conceptual
framework to springboard new discussions in engineering
ethics for how to go about designing care robots according to
the approach we discuss below.
ISSUES AND APPROACHES TO
DESIGNING CARE ROBOTS
The Top-Down Approach
This article aims to analyse how care robots–i.e., machines used in
care practice–can be designed to support and promote the
fundamental values in care practices. There is already a wide
variety of autonomous machines currently used in assistance and
care: My Spoon is a robot able to spoon-feed an assisted person,
Sanyo, to wash and rinse him. Further, robots such as RIBA
(Robot for Interactive Body Assistance) can move patients from
one place to another, while Care-o-bots do likewise with objects
in a room. And as well as robots to monitor people’s health and
wellbeing, there are nursebots, used to reminds the elderly of
certain routine activities (from eating and drinking to taking
medicine and washing their teeth) and accompany their
movements within a space–while Pepper, NAO, Kabochan,
Brian 2.1, and Nexi 2 are humanoid robots that can not only
move their arms, dance, and answer questions but also gather
information through a camera and microphone and entertain the
assisted person with basic games. This section intends to discuss
the top-down and bottom-up strategies to design artificial moral
agents (AMAs). “Top-down approaches to this task involve
turning explicit theories of moral behaviour into algorithms.
Bottom-up approaches involve attempts to train or evolve
agents whose behaviour emulates morally praiseworthy human
behaviour” (Allen et al., 2006: 149).
The “top-down” approach may look the easiest from an
engineering perspective because it consists of programming
the machine according to general behavioural principles (or
laws). As noted by Van Rysewyk and Pontier (2015), such an
approach is particularly apt to operationalize utilitarian or
deontological ethical perspectives. It also follows a long-
standing moral tradition that identifies the correct behaviour
with that conforming to the law. Asimov’s three laws of robotics
are an example of this type of solution, in that they bind the
machine to act according to general principles at all times
(Anderson, 2008). Some attempts to program robots to be
“good” using a principlist approach have been reported in the
literature. Winfield et al. (2014) discuss research in which robots
are programmed to achieve a goal and to prevent other robots (as
proxy humans) from getting hurt (for example, by falling into a
hole or ending up in a dangerous area). According to Winfield
et al. (2014, p. 5), this is an example of a robot that “appears to
match remarkably well with Asimov’s first law of robotics: A
robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a
human being to come to harm.” Arkin (2009) have also have
proposed a moral system able to adhere to the International law
of war (LOW) and rules of engagement (ROE) and to distinguish
between unethical and ethical actions based on their compliance
or not with international law (Arkin 2009, p. 1).
The problem with a “top-down” approach is that the laws or
general principles constitute overly generic moral references
which may be hard to apply (or interpret) in complex real-life
situations. Furthermore, each case is different and cannot be
reduced a priori to law, which must be interpreted. Thus, an
intelligent robot limiting itself to apply the instructions rigidly has
received risks to interpret them inadequately and to the letter. For
example, suppose we program a robot to serve,1 obey, and protect
human beings. In that case, this could have disastrous
consequences for humanity, in that they could think they are
morally obliged to stop us from doing anything–because the less
we do, the fewer chances we have of getting hurt–or to inflict
serious cerebral damage on us as well, so that we perceive
less pain.
Further, to safeguard and promote a patient’s wellbeing, a
robot programmed to carry out care activities may feel justified in
violating their personal sphere and refusing to obey them and
meet their needs. For example, a robot could inform the health
operators of their patient’s intention to put an end to their life, or
not even help them die after an explicit request, even when the
patient’s existence has become unbearable (Tonkens, 2015:
207–222). Furthermore, it merits questioning whether a care
robot programmed to promote a patient’s good would stop
1Which can also be understood in the negative sense, i.e., allowing for a certain
degree of (negative) freedom to do risky things.
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the surgeon about to operate on them (Wallach and Allen, 2015:
92) or deceive them about their health when the prognosis is
terminal.
Finally, the greater the number of rules andmoral principles to
be respected by the moral agent, the higher the risk that, in certain
situations, two or more principles conflict. To this end, we should
design autonomous machines to confront these situations and
know what–in the case of conflict–is the principle that must
prevail because it is “stronger.” That is, these types of dilemmas,
or moral overload, create inextricable computational roadblocks.
The way to resolve such issues computationally is to have higher-
order principles that can be used to address such dilemmas (Allen
et al., 2006: 150; Goodall, 2014). As new scenarios and new
circumstances present themselves, we should add newmoral rules
and principles (that can resolve the existing conflicts) and specify
their application. But this would not be a solution either. Even if it
is always possible to determine when one norm has precedence
over another, we cannot imagine all possible scenarios. “So even if
deontological ethics can provide a guide in many situations, it
cannot be used as a complete ethical system, due to the
incompleteness of any group of rules and the difficulty of
articulating human ethics in its complexity in a list of rules”
(Goodall, 2014). That is, autonomous systems could end up
in situations that were not foreseen nor even foreseeable.
Moreover, even if we were able to formulate explicit criteria
allowing an artificial moral agent (AMA) to override a rule, “any
such criteria would very likely produce other dilemmas” (Wallach
and Allen, 2015).
For this reason, it seems preferable to find/adopt a single moral
principle or more general and abstract principles from which all
other particular principles (or rules) can be derived. For example,
utilitarian ethics stating that it is right to maximize happiness,
wellbeing, preferences (or informed preferences), or pleasure for
the greatest number of those involved. A strength of
utilitarianism is its apparent ability to quantify goods and
harms. The issue is that calculations could be highly complex
and that an engineering model of ethics (i.e., do you have a
dilemma? Apply the principle) is inadequate for moral life.
Imagine, for example, that we wish to programme machines
according to utilitarian ethics. We want “intelligent” care robots
to promote the patients’ wellbeing as much as possible, but how
can wellbeing be calculated? Only in terms of life years (the more,
the better)? Or do we also consider economic, psychological, and
social wellbeing? Significant disagreements could emerge
regarding the objective to maximize, in that some would think
it proper to maximize “happiness” while others would view it
right to maximize “wellbeing.” Still, others may consider
maximizing “preferences” (or “informed preferences”) while
others again could give value just to “pleasure.”
Further, to calculate wellbeing, should we bear in mind only
the most immediate consequences or take long-term effects (but
how far away?) into consideration? This would also mean
deciding which perspective the intelligent care robots should
assume: whether to protect the interests of the owner or user
(that is, the patient) at all times or consider a more stable, general
point of view and protect the collective interest. Imagine, for
example, that a patient finds themselves at home and is about to
have guests over. Suddenly, a fire breaks out in their kitchen and
spreads into the other rooms of the house: who must the care
robot save? If we consider things morally, it seems fitting that the
robot should not only worry about its owner but assume a general
point of view: my wellbeing counts, but so does anyone else’s.
However, still, certain decisions could end up as
counterproductive. For example, programming care robots to
protect general interests could reduce (or even extinguish)
interest in these machines and slow down their adoption (at
least in the short term). The most appropriate solution seems to
minimize the consequences, considering the interests of both the
care robot’s owners and anyone else (i.e., the general interest). But
there is no single way to bring together and balance these different
interests: we could give more value to the general interest, do the
opposite, or consider them equally.
Utilitarianism presents the same problems as the so-called
deontological ones. They appear to be unable to derive from
highly abstract, generic premises; solutions can orientate people
in concrete situations when choosing (Williams, 2011).
Utilitarianism seems to permit the construction of scientific
ethics. Still, the same precise and rigorous conditions cannot
be achieved in practice as in science. Further, an engineering
model of morality does not solve but intensifies moral contrasts in
that it reduces all differences to divergences that are of principle
disjunctions, hence harder to overcome. That is, “taking for
granted that the only way to face ethical disputes is to apply
this deductive and axiomatic model of practical rationality ends
up making it almost impossible to overcome disagreement”
(Lecaldano, 2005: 16).
The Bottom-Up Approach
The alternative to the top-down model is the one we have called
bottom-up: here, the strategy to make machines moral does not
consist in giving them laws or general principles. The bottom-up
approach allows artificial intelligence to learn morality (that is,
what ethical behaviour is) through experience and learning
without the need for general principles. Allen et al. (2006)
liken this approach to the way a human child learns, and van
Rysewyk and Pointier define it as an approach that creates “a
series of learning situations through which a machine works its
way toward a level of ethical understanding acceptable by the
standards humans define” (2015: 99). Small pieces of knowledge
gained through experience, manipulated by programmers as new
challenges and tensions arise, all done within a learned social
context in which the AMA is situated and able to grow (Allen
et al., 2006: 151).
According to Aimee van Wynsberghe, the most promising
manner of programming a care robot based on an alternative
approach to the top-down one is to integrate the traditional value
sensitive design (VSD) approach with normative criteria and
elements from care ethics (van Wynsberghe, 2015; van
Wynsberghe, 2016). Care ethics appears as an alternative
perspective to the strategies inspiring a lot of modern moral
philosophy based on an appeal to universal, abstract, and
impersonal rules (principles that may be assumed to be valid
for humanity overall), which should regulate the behaviour of
separate, independent individuals. According to care ethics, it is
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wrong to reduce the moral to merely obeying norms and
principles imposed on real life and people’s experience
(Tronto, 1993; Botti, 2015; Collins, 2015). A long-standing
philosophical tradition has linked morality with the ability to
assume a completely detached perspective from our particular
interests, the concreteness of the situation and relations, and the
ties in which we are involved. Nevertheless, morality means not
conforming to or applying general principles (or moral laws).
Still, rather it corresponds to the ability to develop dispositions
and practices of care and attention towards others (considered
not as abstract individuals, but perceived in their concreteness
and particularity). That is, from this perspective, morals are not
the mere execution of a mechanical task (the simple application of
a law or general principle to a particular case), but a practice
requiring sensitivity (that is, attention)–and of course
empathy–towards others. Likewise, it is also the subject’s
awareness of their relation to others and developing an ability
to listen and sentimental communication (Gilligan, 1982; Botti,
2015; Collins, 2015).
The considerations above should suffice to highlight that care
ethics involves the importance of connection (Noddings, 1984;
Noddings, 2002) and the relationship between individuals, their
choices, and the context where they find themselves situated
(Botti, 2018: 16). Dependence is the sign of vulnerability, but it is
possible through this dependence to feel a responsibility of care
towards one’s neighbour and to be able to pay more attention
towards others (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984; Tronto, 1993;
Held, 2006). Similarly, care is not perceived as a pre-set ethical
perspective, ready for use in any context, but, as Wynsberghe
(1,025) argues, it is a starting lens to recognize the other person’s
dignity and begin to look after one’s neighbour. Care is already
current practice in our lives, from birth to the moment of death
(Noddings, 1984; Held, 2006). So, according to the supporters of
ethical care, there is no need to justify it, but rather to take its
importance into account to place it at the centre of morality
(Botti, 2015).
In this view, starting from Gilligan’s original formulations,
care ethics is not to be conceived as something which regards
female subjects in as much as they can become mothers: it does
not correspond to “maternal” ethics, but it does constitute a valid
moral paradigm for any person (Slote, 2010; Slote, 2011).
According to Virginia Held, care is first and foremost a form
of emotional, reflective commitment (Held, 1993)–including
sensitivity, solicitude, and worry, but also empathetic
responsiveness, attention to specific needs and contexts, as
well as relationships–which of course has a biological basis.
However, this basis cannot be described as an animal- and/or
human-type “instinct.” It is a social practice, a cultural
transformation of something we already find in maternal care.
Attention is sensitivity, which means that they are central aspects
in responding to others’ needs. But these “natural” abilities may
and (within an appropriate care process) must be refined and
corrected through communication and dialogue exchanges
(Held, 2006). Held does not dwell on this process of refining
moral sensitivity. Still, from her perspective, emotions such as
sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness are moral
emotions that any individual should learn to cultivate to
approach other people’s condition and do that which morality
recommends. Maternal relationships may be the starting point
for care activities, and, for Held, they remain an authoritative
reference model. However, the activity of caring for another is
only learnt through practice and experience. In this way, Slote
(2010); Slote (2011) maintains, we may also develop a broadened,
mediated empathy which stands in relation to situations not
immediately present, through which we can even imagine the
feelings of those farthest away.
In Joan C. Tronto’s opinion, care activity–“[o]n the most
general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity
that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and
repair our “world” so that we can live in it as well as possible. That
world, which includes our bodies, ourselves, and our
environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex,
life-sustaining web” (Tronto, 1993: 103)–plays out in four phases:
1. “Caring about,” where we recognize that care is necessary and
we perceive the existence of a person’s need that must be
satisfied. “Caring about–writes Tronto–will often involve
assuming the position of another person or group to
recognize their needs” (Tronto, 1993, p. 106).
2. “Taking care of,” that is, the moment in which we assume
responsibility towards that need and consider what can be
done, bearing the situation inmind. There is, then, recognition
of the possibility of acting towards the identified need (Tronto,
1993: 106–107)
3. “Caregiving” is committing ourselves to satisfy the need
through work requiring that the one giving care comes into
contact with its recipients (Tronto, 1993: 107).
4. The fourth phase of the process or care activity is the
“receiving care”, because care should also be measured in
terms of appropriateness of the basis of the response from its
recipient: “[u]nless we realize that the object cared for
responds to the care received, we may ignore the existence
of these dilemmas, and lose the ability to assess how
adequately care is provided” (Tronto, 1993: 108).
5. There is, finally, a fifth phase of care–that is, caring with–which
is specific to a democratic society in which the citizens are
constantly involved in taking care, not individually–as
autonomous, self-sufficient subjects–but together with other
people as vulnerable subjects who need care and can trust and
rely on other people. Care (the activity of care) is present in
any society. Still, in a democratic society–writes Tronto–we
have the best care activity because only in a democratic society
is it possible to have institutions promoting caring with
(Tronto, 2013; pp. 154–155).
These moments correspond to specific moral qualities:
attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness, and
trust (and solidarity). Attention is required because the
caregiver must have the ability to perceive the continual
changes in the situation and the needs of the person they are
taking care of, in that there can be no care unless there is attention
to others’ needs. Recognizing others’ needs is a challenging task,
but this is precisely why it is a moral element, and ignoring others’
needs is without any doubt a moral evil (Tronto, 1993: 127),
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whilst responsibility is the ability to take on others’ perceived
needs: it is not a promise; nor is it a commitment to act according
to pre-set formal rules. In other terms, it is the ability to recognize
that we must, based on the role we occupy and the skills we have,
do something to change other peoples’ situation. Also,
competence is the ability to consider the effectiveness of our
actions, because “clearly, making certain that the caring work is
done competently must be a moral aspect of care if the adequacy
of the care given is to be a measure of the success of care” (Tronto,
1993:133). That is, Tronto states, truly responsible (and
appreciable) cannot be uninterested in the consequences,
because–she adds–“from a perspective of care, we would not
permit individuals to escape from responsibility for their
incompetence by claiming to adhere to a code of professional
ethics” (Tronto, 1993: 134).
Then, responsiveness marks the importance of the care
recipient’s response and the caregiver’s duty to pay attention
to the “responses” of those cared for. Good care–writes
Tronto–requires the four care process phases and appropriate
integration of the different skills, or rather, moral elements
necessary to perform it: “Such an integration of these parts of
caring into a moral whole–states Tronto–is not simple. Care
involves conflict; to resolve this conflict will require more than an
injunction to be attentive, responsible, competent, and
responsive” (Tronto, 1993: 136). Finally, trust results from
people’s awareness that they can count on others’ participation
in their care and care activities. At the same time, solidarity is
built when citizens know that they can dispense care with others
better (Tronto, 2013).
Following the care ethicist Joan Tronto (1993), Aimee van
Wynsberghe identifies four fundamental values of care to be
promoted in the design of (autonomous) systems: 1)
attentiveness, as the capacity to recognize the needs of the
care-receiver; 2) responsibility, which implies the caregiver’s
concern for meeting the needs of the care-receiver; 3)
competence, as the capacity of executing an action to fulfill
the needs of the care-receiver; and 4) responsiveness or
reciprocity, as the capacity of the care receiver to guide the
caregiver and the instauration of a reciprocal interaction (van
Wynsberghe, 2012; van Wynsberghe, 2013a; van Wynsberghe,
2013b; van Wynsberghe, 2016). Van Wynsberghe insists that
these four elements are crucial in any care practice that impacts
caregivers and care receivers due to the ethical importance they
assign to the relationship and distribution of roles and
responsibilities (Tronto, 2010). We may add a fifth element,
including trust and solidarity as the caregiver’s ability to
collaborate with others, in a democratic society, in care
activity, enjoying trust in the willingness to participate, and
collaborate with other people (van Wynsberghe, 2021).
Artificial Morality and Moral Training
What we are asking is how to make care robots sufficiently moral,
a question that has been at the centre of ethical concerns already
for some time and widely disseminated by individuals like David
Gunkel, who has reconstructed the different perspectives
developed in philosophy over the relation between morality,
artificial intelligence and robotics (Gunkel, 2012). Building on
what we have discussed thus far, we can conclude that their design
must consider both attentiveness and empathy in whichever care
practice setting.
However, robots are machines: we canmake them increasingly
intelligent (and hence able to respond–or to react–to stimuli of
human beings more and more appropriately), but they remain
incapable–at least for the moment–of “sympathizing” with
others’ needs and interests. So, this questions the possibility of
building robots able to perform care activity integrating a
traditional VSD (Value Sensitive Design) approach with
elements from a care ethics perspective. Starting from Gilligan,
care ethics has underlined that appropriate care activity does not
consist of the ability to detach or abstract ourselves from the
particular context or take distance from the actual features
rationally, but instead of developing sensitivity and solicitude
towards other people. And it is that attention to others’ specific,
particular needs, of which Tronto also speaks, which is, in this
view, reached through practice, experience, and specific abilities:
the willingness to listen to the other and communicate with them
(Tronto, 2013; Tronto, 2015). But, as Gilligan states (1982),
sentimental communication, that is, empathy or sympathy, is
also needed (Noddings, 1984; Noddings, 2002). Meaning the
ability to let ourselves be influenced by other people’s
emotions and feelings. For this reason, robots’ lack of any
moral sensitivity seems to exclude from the start the
possibility of attributing a minimal form of moral ability to
them (Dumouchel and Damiano, 2017).
Yet, the fact that robots are not capable–at least at present–of
feeling sympathy is not problematic: as suggested by
Coeckelbergh (2020), while against the wishes of both
cognitivists and feeling theorists of emotions until robots will
have a consciousness, they will not be able to feel emotions
properly, what Coeckelbergh calls “the appearance of emotions”
and of being entirely moral can be attained. This is because we can
program such sentiments synthetically rather than biologically.
Even though others’ feelings cannot substantially influence a
machine, it could learn to modify its behaviour and emotions
based on others’ reactions and approval (or disapproval),
developing this way a synthetic kind of nature-nurture
interaction which resembles that building up to human moral
development (Coeckelbergh, 2020). In this way, we may expect it
to become a moral (or virtuous) machine over time; able, that is,
to take into account not only the present situation and people but
also the needs and interests of those it interacts and relates with,
taken on in their particularity. The sentiments of love (or esteem)
and hate (or contempt) for our fellows–David Hume (2007) and
Adam Smith (1976) outline in their works–are the most potent
motors of morality, in that we want others to like us and
appreciate our behaviour and the passions and sentiments we
have (Baier, 1991). Robots might be intelligent, but they are
insensitive to others’ reactions because they are not conscious.
However, they could be programmed to regulate their behaviour
(and their “sentiments”) based on the esteem or contempt they
receive from others. For example, moral approval (expressed by
human beings) could be a reason to repeat specific behaviour, and
moral disapproval a cause to modify/change it or make it more
acceptable. We could call this ability to adapt “synthetic
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sensitivity” in that, like “biological” sensitivity, it denotes a
disposition to put oneself in tune with the sentiments of other
people, which is, as van Wynsberghe recalls, the essential quality
for a good care provider: “Being in tune with the delicacy of the
situation, and how to address it, can also be referred to as ethical
sensitivity or “tinkering.” The former adheres to the idea of care
as caring about while the latter is closely linked with care as caring
for, albeit they are not mutually exclusive” (van Wynsberghe,
2015: 35).
Stating that robots can only become moral through practice
and not thanks to abstract training simulations like those
proposed in the Silicon Coppélia experiment mentioned by
Van Rysewyk and Pontier, (2015)– find themselves, that is,
interacting with people and becoming subject to their moral
evaluation–means suggesting a different model of morality from
that indicated by those who think it is possible to make a machine
moral simply by programming it to obey certain principles.
This is not a defect but a strength in the approach we are
suggesting. It recognizes the importance of experience and
education for moral training and the inappropriateness of
reducing the complexity of moral life to a few principles.
As announced at the very beginning, in our view, it is possible
to integrate a 1) care-ethical perspective based on the
consideration of particular care relationships, their contextual
levels and the importance of needs, emotions, and sympathetic
modes of deliberation with 2) a principlist approach to care.
These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, as it has been
thought. They contribute to identifying a more comprehensive
account of care practices that can be operationalized through an
innovative interpretation of two fundamental and orientative
principles and their systemic interrelation: the principle of
vulnerability, on the one hand, and the principle of autonomy,
on the other.
In Tronto’s words, care is not only an activity, but also a flair:
“we insist that the activity of caring is largely defined culturally,
and will vary among different cultures. Fourth, we see caring as
ongoing. Care can characterize a single activity, or it can describe
a process. In this regard, caring is not simply a cerebral concern or
a character trait but the concern of living, active humans engaged
in the processes of everyday living. Care is both a practice and a
disposition” (Tronto, 1993: 103–104). For the Aristotelian ethics
of virtue, dispositions appear as functions or abilities belonging to
human nature.
In contrast, sentimentalist ethics consider the dispositions as
individual character traits that are subject to approval or
disapproval due to the consequences they produce. Referring,
then, to Julia Driver’s definition, we can state that, “A character
trait is a moral virtue if it is a disposition to produce (i.e., it tends
to produce) intentional action that is systematically productive of
the good (Driver, 2001:107). In other terms, dispositions are those
personality or character traits that do not end in action because
they represent principles, that is, stable conduct motifs (Baier,
1991; Baier, 1995): so we may call them qualities characterizing a
person’s character or mind. (Hume, 2007: 3.2.1.2.).
A psychological disposition is made up of accepting a
distinctive fan of considerations as reasons for action and a
tendency to have a certain feeling or combination of emotions,
often driving us to action. A robot cannot be moved by certain
feelings–nor by combining feelings and passions–but it can still
be programmed to act based on particular orientative principles
and consequently manifest the disposition to behave in the way
we prefer. On the basis, that is, of the ethical conception we are
referring to, the ideal would be to have a care robot with the
necessary sensitivity to respond appropriately to the feelings and
emotions of the people he is called to care for. Indeed, for a robot
to empathize with the people it interacts with, it would be easier to
establish how to discharge its tasks. Yet, at least for the moment,
hoping to build a robot endowed with sensitivity and our
empathetic ability is unthinkable. Given the impossibility of
counting on a compassionate robot, we can–as we have
already said–consider making it synthetically (or artificially)
empathetic through a programme allowing it to respond
considering others’ judgement. But beyond this, programming
it with orientative principles, we could also attribute to it a
disposition “to be interested, look after and provide care when
there is an unsatisfied need”. If the robot could have a character,
we would not need to programme it with principles: but the robot
cannot have a character, so the orientative principles could allow
us to influence/condition its character sufficiently appropriately
for our needs. (Dumouchel and Damiano, 2017). From a practical
perspective, programming a machine to follow a few orientative
principles could be advantageous. It would permit not only to
control the machine’s behaviour but also to limit its
autonomous space.
Furthermore, the robot would not need to learn to behave
from scratch, in that it would already be programmed to follow
certain principles, hence ways of behaviour (Allen et al., 2006;
Wallach and Allen, 2015: 114–115). Nor would there be the
problem characterizing “bottom-up” learning, which can be a
prolonged, mistake-ridden process (Van Rysewyk and Pontier,
2015). There is still the risk that the overall principles are too
general or poorly interpreted or that the robot does not know how
to behave. Yet, in the terms described above, a machine sensitive
to the reactions and responses of those it interacts with would be
less subject to these problems. It could learn from practice and
experience to correct its behavior. So even though it may
misapply the moral principles, it could still always correct
itself, taking into account the reactions of those it interacts
with. Both Held (1993), Held (2006), Tronto (1993) stress the
difficulty in grasping other people’s need for care, and for this
reason, they emphasize the importance of dialogue and
communication, as well as–naturally–the finetuning of our
empathic abilities. Our capacity to take care of others’ interests
and needs is limited: sometimes we do not perceive their suffering
nor realize that we are causing them harm; certain forms or ways
of life are invisible or at least remain opaque. A robot could ‘be
born’ with our same defects, but, like us, could still, through
experience/practice, become an appreciable “person”.This
demonstrates that it is possible, in the case of robots, to
integrate 1) a care-ethical perspective based on the
consideration of particular care relationships, their contextual
levels and the importance of needs, emotions and sympathetic
modes of deliberation with 2) a principlist approach to care.
These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, as it has been
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thought, and contribute to individuate a more organic account of
care practices which can be operationalized through an
innovative understanding of two basic principles and their
systemic interrelation: the principle of vulnerability, on the
one hand, and the principle of autonomy, on the other.
FUNDAMENTAL ORIENTATIVE
PRINCIPLES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE
CARE ETHICS APPROACH
Preliminary Orientative Lines
Based on the premises laid out in the preceding section, the main
research question can be rephrased: how can we formulate a
comprehensive approach that can frame the human-robot
interaction overcoming the objective difficulties discussed
above in terms of empathy? We are used to communicating
such issues both from the point of view of human beings and
machines. If we take the first issue discussed in the preceding
section, what we are doing is referring to the possibility–in some
cases welcomed, in others indeed feared–that specific groups of
human beings might develop feelings for robots. More
specifically, there is a typology of relationships that emerge,
i.e., by persons with mental impairments or by elderly people
with affective difficulties or, still, by persons addicted to robot
companion and/or sex robots (Sharkey, 2014; Bendel, 2017;
Balistreri, 2018; Ostrowski et al., 2019; Bisconti Lucidi and
Piermattei, 2020; Jecker, 2020).
On the other hand, we refer to the objective difficulty of
human-robot interaction by considering the second viewpoint:
the tension between a robot executing a programmed behaviour
and an empathetic behaviour towards a human subject. Of
course, we can consider a situation in which the programmer
is committed to programming a sort of synthetic empathy that can
resemble or replicate, as much as possible, empathic behaviour
that is observed in human-human interactions. Again, we are
aware that this is one of the most promising frontiers of the
intersection of big data enquiry and artificial intelligence (Cavallo
et al., 2018).
We are thus perfectly aware of the existing and expanding
debate on such issues. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily to expand
on what are indeed promising theoretical directions in what
follows. Instead, we would aim to propose a preliminary
outline of what has been explored up to now. This is a sort of
theoretical framework that, in a sense, acts as a foundation, and
that thus we propose as one to be inserted into the care-ethics
approach we presented above.
The final expected goal of this insertion (and of the entire
research project which this paper is part of) is to propose a
renewed care-ethics approach that shall integrate the VSD
approach articulated by van Wynsberghe. In what follows, we
will offer a comprehensive argument to ground the legitimacy of
such a theoretical framework by justifying the insertion of two
basic principles whose argumentative role is identifying an
avenue along which trying to integrate a possible renewed
program in care ethics–we attempted to articulate a
preliminary attempt to frame the implementation issue of an
integrated VSD in Umbrello et al. (2021). In turn, we would like
to deepen the same linkage between that framework and the more
traditional care ethics approach in a further step.
Methodological Remarks
In approaching such a framework, some preliminary and
methodological remarks should be clarified.
Firstly, in line with the objections expressed above (§ 2.1), it
merits reiterating that referring to two principles does not mean
that we implicitly affirm a top-down approach. We remain
convinced that such a top-down approach risks substantiating
nothing other than general principles that do not offer concrete
guidance in specific situations or actual settings.
Secondly, introducing a unique principle might imply
operationalizing such a principle by underestimating the
contradictory or aporetic effects derived from it. Some of
them, related to the utilitarian principle of happiness, have
been analyzed above. This tension can be exacerbated by
introducing other relevant principles like “dignity” or
“respect”, for example. One can already imagine the conflict
that would undoubtedly emerge through a haphazard
combination of two or more principles. A striking exemplar
would be between managing the moral overload between two
principles like happiness and dignity.
Furthermore, introducing several (all fundamental) principles
can’t exclude the possibility of creating conflicts and dilemmas
that are undoubtedly difficult to solve within specific operational
situations. This is already true for human beings, but it remains
even more evident for robots. Thus, being fully aware of the risks
of implementation and the conflicts related to a top-down
approach, we indicate two principles that must be framed not
as antithetical but rather complementary.
Tomethodologically avoid affirming a top-down approach, we
instead actively aim at constructing a revision of a bottom-up
approach. This, of course, does not mutually exclude other
approaches like the so-called “mid-level ethical theories” that
have been proposed by van den Hoven (2010), Jacobs and
Huldtgren (2018), and Cenci and Cawthorne (2020) following
the theoretical path traced by the likes of Martha Nussbaum,
Amartya Sen, and John Rawls. We have elsewhere employed such
an approach in application to care robots (Umbrello et al., 2021).
What characterizes this revision of a bottom-up approach is
marked by a straightforward adoption of theories of relationality
as they pertain directly to vulnerability and autonomy, something
that those other approaches do not undertake. That is the line of
argumentation that will be followed here. Nonetheless, some
methodological remarks need to be explained in a revised
bottom-up approach as the one we aim to construct here.
We introduce four remarks here. The first remark is related to
the specific theoretical usage of the term “principle.” Selecting
care ethics as the primary focus implies some particular
difficulties in inserting a discourse on principles since care
ethics originated from the need to avoid an “ethical principle”
in the traditional sense of the term. However, the meaning of the
word “principle” we suggest and deem appropriate here is not to
be understood as a normative term that is external/independent
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org June 2021 | Volume 8 | Article 6542987
Pirni et al. Robot Care Ethics- Autonomy & Vulnerability
to the situation and subsequently commands in the universalistic
sense of the word. Simply put, we are not thinking of a principle
that reproduces the same normative constraints that the Kantian
categorical imperative entails.
Instead, and like Kant, we envision the usage of the term
“principle” as analogous to the one he employed in the Critique of
Pure Reason, where he refers to the “transcendental ideas” that
pure reason faces in the “Transcendental Dialectic” (Kant, 1998,
394–408). Here he argues that these are not to be understood as
strictly “binding principles”; rather, they are instead “orientative
principles.”
That expression refers to principles that must be considered
asymptotic lines that can aggregate and gather patterns of
behaviours that might prima facie be considered divergent.
They are the peak of normative purity that trigger a constant
interest for human reason and which individual agency is
inescapably addressed. In Kantian terms, they are principles
that cannot be the object of knowledge. Principles, then, are
impossible for human beings to experience. We do not know such
principles nor experience them in the total sense of the term. We
can rationally imagine them as a point of orientation, a focus that
orients our action and systematizes it along a coherent path.2
If we defer to the Kantian perspective, this comprehensive
qualification of the “transcendental ideas” as “principles” is valid
for both the cognitive and the practical realm. In the present
context, we can imagine the same extended perspective.
Nonetheless, what is more relevant for this level of
discussion–and this is the second methodological remark–is
that those principles should be considered orientative for and
within any context of interrelation. The implications of this point
are twofold.
1. On the one hand, we affirm that those principles should be
considered orientative lines for any possible setting or state of
affairs in which a form of exchange occurs that we can call
“interaction.” Phenomenologically speaking, we might agree
on a minimal meaning of the term “interaction” by affirming
the coexistence of two conditions: 1) this term describes a
univocal spacetime frame in which at least two agents are
present; 2) they are or become aware of the (effects of an)
action that the first is doing as addressed to the second.
2. On the other hand, we would like to suggest that those
principles should orient the pattern of action that guides
any possible relationship among beings that share a “status
of subjectivity.” As a primary point of reference that can be
commonly shared, with this expression, we mean a being that
can start a “state of affairs” they are responsible for. We don’t
want to enter here further by embarking on a theoretical
account of the subjectivity of robots [for a preliminary
framing, see Stradella et al. (2012)]. Taking for granted that
we are speaking about robots that are complex enough to
consider themselves as starting points of possible (patterns of)
actions, we are just alluding to the possible relationship
network of humans-humans and humans-machines (by
leaving open the possibility to imagine robot-robot
relationships–which we do not investigate here).
Thirdly, by considering the principles we will articulate as
orientative ones, we are paving the way for a different line of
inquiry. We are thinking of principles that are intense, pervasive,
and flexible enough to both inform and orient at the same time, as
well as function in any context of the interrelation of each possible
“subject” involved in it–again, by attributing such a status to both
humans and robots. In more synthetic terms, we maintain that
such a kind of principle can be adequate for orienting both the
contextual settings or situation (embedding perspective) and the
forms of subjectivity involved in them (embodying perspective).
We will integrate this point in the following paragraph.
Last but not least, as our fourth methodological remark, the
comprehensive approach here used can be described as
hermeneutical. We can attribute this evocative word to the
same twofold meaning that Hans-Georg Gadamer intended
(Gadamer, 2013)–“fusions of horizons” on the one hand and
as “history of effects” on the other. We would like to allude that
any single situation or context of interrelation has its
characteristics, spatial/temporal borders and constraints, and it
embeds specific actors in it. There are no privileged or external
points of view that can account for it with sufficient
accuracy–and, consequently–that can take appropriate
decisions outside the subjects involved in it. If this affirmation
may be considered accurate for any interaction situation, it
becomes still more evident by referring to forms of
relationships mediated by technologies (Pirni and Carnevale,
2013; Pirni and Carnevale , 2014; Pirni et al., 2017). Again,
this is another way of excluding from the very beginning the
possibility for any top-down (now: external-internal) approach.
Moreover, accuracy in making decisions is in direct proportion to
the habits of interrelating with those specific agents or issues. In
short, it is the result of intersubjective historicity that is lived in
common.
AUTONOMY AND VULNERABILITY: A
DUALITY OF PRINCIPLES FOR A
RENEWED CARE-ETHICS APPROACH
By moving forward in designing the proposed approach, we
must outline a comprehensive definition of each of the two
principles we want to offer in this context. Again, to avert any
reference to a top-down approach, we avoid the insertion of
any unique or unifying principle. Instead, the insertion of the
systemic linkage of two orientative principles (in the sense
outlined above) we are going to illustrate has to be considered
within a sharp argumentative lie that can be summarized in
what follows:
1. Both principles are to be considered on the same plane or level.
No one of them should be regarded as a priority, even in
extreme conflictual situations;
2For a parallel approach that uses “insight” as the key-concept instead of
“principle,” in order to give space to a similar need for an orientative
perspective in care ethics, see Leget et al. (2019).
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2. They are constitutively complementary: neither an account of
(a focus on) autonomy without considering vulnerability nor
an asymmetric opposite account (focus) is admitted. They are
two, but none of them can be neither subjected to the other nor
avoided or underestimated in favour of the other.
Autonomy and Care: A Preliminary Outline
Accordingly, the comprehensive account of each of the two
principles should be considered within a strong linkage with
the other. This is precisely the meaning through which the same
hermeneutic/phenomenological framework outlined above
articulates. If we try and grasp the most phenomenologically
evident meaning of both principles, we can affirm that they are
opposed. What we are alluding to here is a theoretical
understanding, which is related to an experience from the
first-person point of view, more than linguistic antonyms (the
subsequent paragraphs are devoted to expand and widely ground
this point). Rather than being a weakness of our argument, their
constituting opposite principles are, in fact, an intended
characteristic that substantiates our reasoning. By adopting
both principles, on the one hand, through autonomy, we set as
an objective the guarantee of the maximum conceivable extent of
independence to the individual. At the same time, by also
contemplating the principle of vulnerability, we aim at the full
possible degree of relationality and dependence of a subject from
(an)other one (-s).
Accordingly, to try and outline a meaning of the principle of
autonomy that is constitutively open towards and provide a
potential integration to the principle of vulnerability, certainly
the common understanding of “autonomy” must be finetuned in
some of its primary and “classic” characteristics.
First of all, we must distinguish autonomy from arbitrium,
distinguishing the former from arbitrary/unconstrained agency.
Being autonomous does not mean “to do whatever one wants”
nor whatever is conceivable and possible, according to one’s own
overall capability to act/to avoid acting in any context in which
one’s action might take place and be oriented to any (subject or
thing) present in it. Such a definition would correspond to the
very meaning of the concept of arbitrium. Here we indeed wish to
differentiate from the first principle we were introducing-that is
autonomy.
Instead, the concept of autonomy we are searching for is a
principle that systematically opens up the possibility of acting in a
context in which other subjects are acting or might act and,
therefore, endowed with a relational dimension. In this
understanding, the individual will is structurally open to any
possible principle of concrete acting. Yet, it must select and
choose among possible principles of acting while keeping in
mind a general meta-rule that is shaped in line with the
Kantian third formulation of the categorical imperative. This
imperative would mean that anytime you are on the verge of
acting, try to articulate, select, and put into practice just. Only that
principle of action can you rationally imagine that any other
subject may want and affirm on their behalf. In other words, try to
act by orienting your agency while having in mind a systemic
approval of your action and the subjective principle that guided it
by any other subject who might act or might be the recipient of
your activity in the same context. As we can see, such a
formulation of the categorical imperative is inextricably tied to
a conception of the individual, which is far from being solipsistic,
like other different understandings of the concept of autonomy
suggest.
Of course, in line with a relational conception of subjectivity,
the target of our conceptual framework corresponds both to the
individual as the subject who acts and to the individual as the
subject who “receives” the action. In this perspective, then, being
autonomous does not mean being a solipsistic agent pursuing
their own goal whatever the conditions, whatever other subjects
and correlative goals they may encounter. Rather, being
autonomous means finding a systemic and dynamic balance
between the need for self-sufficiency and the capability to start
a state of affairs by one’s own will on the one hand, and the need
to take care of the analogous need and capability that guides and
orientates the agency of any other subject in any specific context,
on the other.
Ultimately, according to this definition, being autonomous
means taking care of the autonomy of others as well as of the
potential fragility and vulnerability that is endowed in each and
every one of us (Pirni, 2006; Pirni, 2013; Pirni, 2016).
Vulnerability andCare: A PreliminaryOutline
Given the understanding of autonomy we just outlined, its
interplay with the principle of vulnerability is less problematic
than one would expect. The endorsement of vulnerability can
now be understood as coherent with but even necessary to the
realization of the idea of autonomy we set up in the previous
section. To define vulnerability, as a first approximation, we can
build on a phenomenologically evident (instead of at-first-sight
contradictory, as with our definition of autonomy) understanding
of the concept. According to this understanding of vulnerability,
the basic situation becomes one in which no individual can either
live or survive, nor can they pursue their own goals alone.
Relationality, in this view, is not just courtesy, nor a possible
or socially acceptable behaviour, but rather an intrinsic
characteristic of the subject. Such subjects do not stand alone
but are permanently embedded in a relational net with others for
survival and fulfilment. Relationality is a matter of systemic and
vital necessity.
It merits noting here that we are not alluding to unique
situations that bear clear evidence, like the condition of people
with impairments. Instead, the perspective we adopt is in line
with theories that see subjects as embedded in a net of relations
and in contextual circumstances that try to manage - but, in the
end, are forced to confirm-our constitutive dependence at the
individual level as well as at the systemic one (Kittay, 1999). Such
perspective is shared by normative frameworks such as relational
egalitarianism (See Voigt, 2020). More importantly, the present
research is first and foremost built upon the understanding of
subjectivity expounded by feminist thinking (See, inter alia,
Butler, 2004). Thus, we are not referring to a vulnerable
subject in the sense that they are practically dependent on
others to fulfill daily needs or perform basic activities. Instead,
we refer to the basic constitutive situation of vulnerability shared
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by every human being as an embedded feature of humanity,
which is accurate and operating for each subject capable of acting.
Such a subject is solely prima facie independent or autonomous.
They are forced to act in a world shared with other subjects,
within definite boundaries and facing a series of limitations in
terms of lack of resources or deficiency of time. Following Arendt
(1958), we can say that “Men [human beings] and not Man, live
on the earth and inhabit the world” and that one defining
characteristic of humanity is plurality. Further, they can be
cognitively/ethically vulnerable, in the sense of not being
equipped with sufficient knowledge as well as the ethical
competencies to overcome specific difficulties, constraints, and
limitations that interfere with both the most linear pursuit of their
tasks and the due care to the autonomy/vulnerability of others.
In sum, the final achievement of this provisional theoretical
path is a constitutive interdependence between the two principles.
This might offer a challenging and potentially open theoretical
“platform” to relaunch a care ethics perspective more in line with
the demanding and urgent reshaping of any possible integration
between human and machine.
CONCLUSION
Various approaches have been undertaken in an attempt to
integrate ethical principles and practices in care ethics. This
has similarly been an approach applied to the design and
development of robotic technologies that fall within the
domain of care (§ 1). This paper has taken these approaches
as a starting point, illustrating how they have been employed and
their shortcomings. In particular, we showed how both the
traditional top-down and bottom-up approaches have
fundamental misgivings (§ 2). This, consequently, is
inextricably linked with foundational ethical issues. To address
these issues, we propose a revision of the bottom-up approach as
the most salient starting point for rethinking care ethics as it is
applied to robots. The central innovative contribution of this
paper is the proposal of rehabilitation of two orientative
principles that can surround the entire theoretical building of
any care ethics approach.
These principles were selected following a specific
methodology (§ 3), which led to identifying an ethical
horizon where the interplay between autonomy and
vulnerability includes both humans and machines on a
single plane. On the one hand, this horizon enhances the
potential autonomy of both, but it also highlights their
respective and constitutive vulnerability. On the other, this
opens up the possibility of a new relational dimension (§ 4). In
doing so, the central contribution of this approach aims to
provide a framework that promises a more salient interplay,
and possibly a novel integration, that is directed towards the
future of our “living togetherness,”
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